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A THEORY OF DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY, I: OVERVIEW AND 
QUANTITY  COMPETITION WITH LARGE FIXED COSTS 
BY ERIC  MASKIN  AND  JEAN  TIROLE' 
The paper introduces  a class of alternating-move  infinite-horizon  models  of duopoly. 
The timing  is meant  to capture  the presence  of short-run  commitments.  Markov  perfect 
equilibrium  (MPE)  in this  context  requires  strategies  to depend  only on the  action  to which 
one's opponent  is currently  committed.  The dynamic  programming  equations  for an MPE 
are derived. 
The first  application  of the model  is to a natural  monopoly,  in which  fixed  costs are so 
large that at most one firm  can make  a profit.  The firms  install  short-run  capacity.  In the 
unique  symmetric  MPE,  only one firm  is active  and  practices  the quantity  analogue  of limit 
pricing.  For commitments  of brief  duration,  the market  is almost  contestable.  We conclude 
with a discussion  of more  general  models  in which  the alternating  timing  is derived  rather 
than  imposed. 
Our  companion  paper  applies  the model  to price  competition  and provides  equilibrium 
foundations  for kinked  demand  curves  and Edgeworth  cycles. 
KEYwoRDs: Markov  perfect  equilibrium,  short-run  commitment,  reaction,  natural  mo- 
nopoly,  contestability,  endogenous  timing. 
INTRODUCTION 
IN THIS  PAIR  of  papers, we present a theory of  how oligopolistic  firms behave 
over  time.  One  of  our goals is- to  study certain well-known concepts,  such as 
contestability and the kinked demand curve, that are implicitly dynamic but have 
usually been discussed in static models. The main ingredient of our study is the 
idea of reactions based on short-run commitments. 
When  we  say  that firm 1 is  committed to  a particular action in  the  short- 
run-whether  a quantity or a price-we  mean that it cannot change that action 
for a finite (although possibly brief) period, during which time other firms might 
act. By firm 2's reaction to 1 we mean the response it makes, possibly after some 
lag, to l's  chosen action. Short-run commitment ensures that, by the time firm 2 
reacts, firm 1 will not already have changed its action.2 
To formalize the idea of reaction based on commitment, we introduce a class 
of  infinite-horizon  sequential duopoly  games. In  the simplest version of  these 
games  (the  exogenous  timing  framework), the  two  firms move  alternatingly. 
Firms maximize their discounted sum of single-period profits, and our goal is to 
characterize the perfect equilibria. The fact that, once it has moved, a firm cannot 
move again for two periods implies a degree of commitment. 
1 This work was supported  by grants  from the NSF and the Sloan Foundation.  We thank  Peter 
Diamond,  David Kreps,  Reinhard  Selten,  Robert  Wilson,  two  referees,  and  especially  John  Moore  for 
helpful discussions  and comments. 
2 It is useless  to respond  (in our  sense  of the term)  to another's  action  if, by the time  one has done 
so, the other  firm  has already  moved  again.  That  is why our conception  of reaction  is intimately  tied 
to commitment.  It may  be worthwhile  reacting  to a firm's  move  because  the firm  is committed  to that 
move, at least for a time. 
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We  have in  mind primarily exogenous or technological reasons for commit- 
ment,  e.g., installed capital that has little scrap value, or lags in producing and 
disseminating price lists. Alternatively, short-term contracts might serve to bind 
the firm temporarily.3 
We  suppose  that each firm uses a  strategy that makes its  move in  a  given 
period  a  function  only  of  the  other  firm's most  recent  move.  Our  primary 
justification  for this simplifying assumption-we  provide a lengthier discussion 
below-is  that it makes strategies dependent only on  the physical state of  the 
system,  those  variables that are directly payoff-relevant. Consequently, we can 
speak legitimately of a firm's  reaction to another's action, rather than to an entire 
history of actions by both firms. 
Section  2  derives  the  dynamic  programming equations  associated  with  an 
equilibrium in  strategies of  this sort, i.e., with a "Markov perfect equilibrium" 
(MPE).  Then, in  Section 3, we begin the formal analysis of our project with a 
study of models where firms compete in capacities (quantities) and in which fixed 
costs are so large that only one firm can make a profit. For the exogenous timing 
version of the model, we show that there exists a unique symmetric MPE. In this 
equilibrium, only one firm produces (thus the model may be considered more an 
example of monopoly  than duopoly) and, furthermore, for discount factors that 
are not too low, operates above the pure monopoly level in order to deter entry. 
Such  behavior  can  be  thought  of  as  the  quantity-analogue  of  limit  pricing 
behavior (see  Gaskins (1971), Kamien and Schwartz (1971), and Pyatt (1971)). 
Moreover,  as  the  discount factor tends  to  one,  so  that future profits become 
increasingly important, the entry-deterring quantity approaches the competitive 
(i.e., zero-profit level) quantity, a result much in the spirit of the recent contest- 
ability literature (see, for example, Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982)). 
Of course, the assumption that firms' moves necessarily alternate is artificial; 
one  might  wonder why we  did  not  suppose  that moves  are simultaneous. To 
provide proper foundations for our alternating move hypothesis, therefore, we 
consider a more elaborate class of models where firms can, in principle, move at 
any  time they choose (Section 4). Yet, as before, once a firm selects a move, it 
remains committed  to that action for a finite length of  time. When we restrict 
attention to strategies that are functions only of the physical state, we find that, 
in  a number of cases of interest (in particular, the models studied in these two 
papers) the equilibrium behavior in endogenous timing models closely parallels 
that in the games where alternation is imposed. 
3Here,  however, we are on weaker ground theoretically because, once we admit the possibility of 
contractual commitment, we have to explain why commitments of indefinite duration are impossible 
or too costly, a knotty question. One explanation may be transaction costs-the  expense of drawing 
up a complex contract of infinite length. A second (related) reason is the difficulty of foreseeing all 
possible  later contingencies that might arise. A third is the possibility of renegotiation; the contract- 
ing  parties'  ability  to  replace  their original contract  with  a  new  one  at  a  later  date  limits  the 
commitment value of the former. See also the discussion in Section 9 of our companion paper, which 
suggests that in some settings, oligopolists would not opt for lengthy contracts even if these were not 
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Our companion paper (Maskin-Tirole (1988)) studies models of price competi- 
tion  in markets with undifferentiated commodities. We show that two classical 
phenomena, the kinked demand curve equilibrium and the Edgeworth cycle, arise 
naturally as equilibria of our models. 
The third paper in this series (Maskin-Tirole  (1987)) considers competition in 
the  absence  of  fixed  costs  (Cournot  competition),  and  develops  differential 
methods for studying equilibrium (such techniques do not apply in the first two 
papers, where the models are highly discontinuous). 
2.  THE GENERAL  MODEL  WITH  FIXED  TIMING 
We next present the basic features of the simpler (exogenous timing) class of 
models that we analyze below. 
A.  The Model 
We consider a duopoly; the model can be generalized to more than two firms 
but at the expense of simplicity. Each firm i (i = 1,2) chooses actions a' from a 
bounded  action  space A  (we assume that the action space is bounded  so  that 
dynamic  programming is  applicable). Depending  on  the interpretation of  the 
model  the variable a'  could represent the choice of  a price, quantity, location, 
etc. It could even represent a vector of choices. Firms act in discrete time, and the 
horizon  is  infinite.  Periods are indexed  by  t  (t =  0,1,...)  and  T  is  the  time 
between two consecutive periods. At time t firm i's  instantaneous profit  g'  is a 
function of the current actions of the two firms but not of time: 
7Ti _  T'(a',  a2). 
Firms discount  future profits with the same interest rate r. Thus their discount 
factor is 
8 = exp (-rT). 
Firm i's  intertemporal profit can then be written 
00 
Il=  i8v(al,  a2) 
t  =0  t=O 
As mentioned in the introduction, we wish to model the ideas that (a) firms are 
committed  to  their actions for a finite length of  time, during which time other 
firms might move, and that (b) they react to the current actions of other firms. 
The simplest way of accomplishing both objectives is to assume, following Cyert 
and  DeGroot  (1970),  that firms move  sequentially. In  odd-numbered periods 
(t = 1, 3, 5, ... ) firm 1 chooses an action to which it is committed for two periods. 
That  is,  a 2k +2=  alk+  for  all  k.  Similarly, firm.2  moves  in  even-numbered 552  ERIC MASKIN AND JEAN TIROLE 
periods (t = 0,2, 4,...)  and ak  =a22k.  Thus there  is a lag T between  a firm's 
actions and its rival's  reaction.4 
The model ignores the issue of  who moves first (we might suppose for 
completeness  that the first  mover  is determined  by historical  accident).  Instead, 
we  are interested in  the  long-run  properties  of  the model, those that are 
independent of  what happens at the beginning  of  the game. Indeed, in the 
applications  of our model provided  in these two papers,  steady-state  is always 
reached regardless  of initial conditions.  Moreover,  the nature  of steady-state  is 
independent  of the initial  conditions  (modulo  possibly  relabeling  the firms). 
We require  equilibrium  of this model to be perfect.  That is, starting  from any 
point in the game tree, the firm to move selects the action that maximizes  its 
intertemporal  profit  given  the subsequent  strategies  of its rival  and itself. We do 
not accept any perfect equilibrium,  however,  but just those whose strategies 
depend only on the "  payoff-relevant"  history. Specifically,  at time t = 2k, the 
only aspect of history  that has any "direct"  bearing  on current  or future  payoffs 
is the value of  a'k  1' for only this variable,  among all those before time 2k, 
enters any instantaneous  profit function from time 2k  on. Thus, if the equi- 
librium  is to depend  only on payoff-relevant  history,  firm  2's strategy  at time 2k 
must depend only on a'2k-1. That is, 
a2k  =R  2k(a2k-l)- 
Moreover,  because the future  appears  the same starting  from any time period, 
time itself is not a payoff-relevant  variable,  and so above we can drop the 
subscript "2k"  from R.  Thus, we can represent  the firms' behavior-their 
strategies-by  a pair of dynamic reaction  functions:5 
R': A -*A 
and 
R2: A -*A. 
Actually,  although  it will not play a major  role in this paper,  we must allow for 
the possibility  that R1 and R2 are random  functions,  so that R1(a2) and R2(a') 
are, in general,  random  variables. 
Because dynamic  reaction  functions  depend  only on the payoff-relevant  state 
of the system, they might  alternatively  be called "Markov  strategies."  A pair of 
reaction functions (R', R2)  forms a  Markov  perfect  equilibrium  (MPE) if and 
only if (i) a2k  =  R2(ak-l)  maximizes  firm  2's intertemporal  profit  at any time 
2k, given al k- 1 and assuming  that  henceforth  each  firm  i will move according  to 
R'; and (ii) the analogous  condition  holds for firm  1. Of course,  if R1 and R2 are 
4 Notice  that we are supposing that firms' actions are equally spaced. Although this assumption 
does not affect the most salient qualitative features of equilibrium in Section 3 and the models of our 
companion piece, it does considerably simplify the analysis of equilibrium. 
5 We  use  the  modifier "dynamic" to  distinguish this concept  from the "reaction functions" of 
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random  functions  we  must  replace  (i)  by  the  statement  that  each  possible 
realization  of  R2(a'k-1)  maximizes firm 2's  expected intertemporal profit (we 
assume risk neutrality). The following proposition is a simple consequence of the 
theory of dynamic programming. 
PROPOSITION  1:  A Markov  perfect equilibrium  is a perfect equilibrium. That is, 
given that its rival ignores all but the payoff-relevant  history, a firm can just as well 
do the same. 
We  have  several reasons for  restricting our attention  to  Markov strategies. 
Their most obvious appeal is their simplicity. Firms' strategies depend on as little 
as possible while still being consistent with rationality. 
More relevant from our perspective is that Markov strategies seem at times to 
accord  better  with  the  customary  conception  of  a  reaction  in  the  informal 
industrial organization literature than do, say, the reactions emphasized in  the 
repeated game (or "supergame") tradition, the best-established formal treatment 
of  dynamic  oligopoly  to  date.  In  supergames, reactions are, typically,  threats 
made  to  dissuade  the rival firm from selecting certain actions. The  idea  that 
reacting is  following  through on  a  threat is  very different from the reasoning 
behind, say, the kinked-demand curve story. In the kinked-demand curve world, 
cutting one's own price in response to another firm's price cut is not carrying out 
a  threat at  all.  It  is  merely an  act  of  self-defense,  an  attempt  to  regain lost 
customers. Put another way, the reaction is a response only to the other firm's 
price cut and not to earlier history or to one's own past prices. 
In our companion piece we discuss some well-known methodological difficul- 
ties with the supergame approach (e.g., the large number of equilibria, and the 
nonrobustness  of  equilibrium to  the horizon). Because we  do  not  know  how 
successfully  our alternative framework of  short-run commitments and Markov 
strategies overcomes these problems in general, we limit our comparison of the 
two  approaches  to  the  simple price and  quantity settings  that have been  the 
source of most applications of supergames to industrial organization. 
The  reader may  wonder whether focussing  attention  on  the payoff-relevant 
states buys us anything in more general models. After all, most past actions are 
likely  to have at least some influence on current and future payoffs. Yet, if we 
make  strategies contingent on  all past  actions,  the Markov restriction has  no 
bite. This is certainly an apt criticism of the formal Markov assumption. But it 
neglects  our preoccupation with  short-run commitment. Such commitment im- 
plies  that recent actions have a stronger bearing on current and future payoffs 
than those of the more distant past. A natural hypothesis posits that past actions 
having only  a small influence on  payoffs have a correspondingly circumscribed 
effect  on  current  behavior. The  Markov assumption  captures this  hypothesis, 
albeit  through the crude device of  supposing literally no impact on payoffs by 
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B.  Markov Perfection  and Dynamic Programming 
We can solve for a Markov perfect equilibrium by invoking the game theoretic 
analogue of dynamic programming. To this end, we define four value functions. 
Given  an  equilibrium pair  of  Markov  strategies (R1, R2)  let  V1(a2)  be  the 
present discounted value of firm l's profits given that last period firm 2 played a 2 
and  that henceforth both firms play optimally, i.e., according to  their Markov 
strategies, and let Wl(al)  be the present discounted value of firm l's profits given 
that last period firm 1 played a'  and that henceforth both firms play optimally. 
V2(a1)  and W2(a2)  are defined symmetrically. 
These value functions must be consistent with the reaction functions. Specifi- 
cally, given that firm i's choice of ai is restricted to a bounded set, the following 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for the reaction and value functions to 
correspond to an equilibrium: 
V1(a2)  =  max { 7T(al,  a2)  + 3W1(al)} 
al 
=  7rT(Rl(a2),  a2)  +  SW1(R1(a2)) 
and 
W1(al)  =  g1(al,  R2(a'))  + SV'(  2(a')), 
(with analogous equations for V2 and W2), where expectation operators should 
appear before the expressions on the right-hand side if  R1 and R2 are random 
functions. 
3.  Quantity Competition  with Large Fixed Costs: Fixed Timing 
We  turn next  to  a specific application of  our general model,  the analysis of 
markets with large fixed costs. For this purpose, we shall take quantities to be 
firms' strategy variables. One should interpret a choice of quantity as that of a 
scale  of  operation  or capacity. We shall express profit as a direct function  of 
quantities/capacities.  Our profit function is,  therefore, a reduced form, which 
subsumes instantaneous price competition. 
The  industrial  organization literature has  traditionally distinguished among 
three types of  costs of production. Variable costs are incurred only during the 
period of production and are directly related to the level of operation. Fixed costs 
(measured as a flow) persist only as long as production continues, but are, strictly 
speaking,  independent  of  scale. Pure sunk costs  (again, considered as  a  flow) 
continue  as  a  liability  forever. That  is,  they  are  incurred with  or  without 
production. 
Both  fixed  and  sunk  costs  have  been  regarded as  barriers to  entry.  The 
entry-deterring role of sunk costs is not controversial. When sunk costs take the 
form  of  an  irreversible investment in  nondepreciable capital, a firm's variable 
cost  curves  may  be  forever changed,  giving  it  a  permanent  advantage  over 
potential  entrants or later rivals. This effect has been studied by Spence (1977, DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY, I  555 
1979), Dixit  (1979), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). Even when capital is not 
infinitely durable it may still deter entry as argued by Eaton and Lipsey (1980).6 
The  deterrent that fixed costs  create is  one  of  the  subjects of  the  "natural 
barriers to  entry" literature (see  Scherer (1980)  for  a  survey). A  firm in  an 
oligopolistic  industry  (one  with  large  fixed  costs)  can,  by  virtue  of  its  in- 
cumbency, deter entry since the revenue available to a potential entrant does not 
outweigh  the  high  fixed  costs  it  has  to  bear.  This  view  has  recently  been 
challenged  by  Grossman (1981)  and  Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982),  who 
maintain that incumbency gives a firm no privileged position  per se  if its costs 
are  merely  fixed  rather than  sunk.  Such  a  firm ought  not  be  able  to  earn 
substantial monopoly  profit while its potential competitors earn nothing. These 
authors feel that the threat of entry should drive the profit of the incumbent to 
zero, the "competitive" level. We shall attempt in this section and the next  to 
reconcile these conflicting views. 
Returning to the model of Section 2, we shall suppose that two identical firms 
move alternately and choose nonnegative quantities (more accurately, capacities), 
q.  They  maximize  the discounted  sum of  instantaneous profits, with  discount 
factor 3. If q is chosen to be strictly positive, we shall assume that the firm incurs 
a fixed cost  F. We shall suppose that this cost is incurred up-front. But, since the 
firm is committed to the capacity q for two periods, we can think of f = F/(1  + 8) 
as the per-period or flow equivalent of F. Viewed this way, the fixed cost can be 
thought  of  as  a  "short-term" sunk cost.  To  simplify matters, we  assume that 
variable costs are linear: variable cost of q =  cq; and that demand is also linear: 
price  = 1 -  (ql +  q2),  where q'  is  firm i's  choice7 of  q.  Thus, firm l's  instanta- 
neous profit is 
(1)  X  (q'q)I=(?(  ql  -q 2cql  -f,  if  ql >  0 
(1)  IT  1  (q9q2  ,  2  {(  f  0 
and firm 2's profit is symmetric. 
We shall assume that fixed costs are so large that one but not two firms can 
operate  profitably.  Specifically,  let  7Tm  =  d 2/4,  where  d =  1 -  c  (7T  m  is  just 
monopoly  profit gross of fixed costs). Then our profitability assumption requires 
(2)  2f>  7T>f. 
(Actually, as a referee pointed out, we could probably replace the left inequality 
with the assumption that f  exceeds Cournot profit.) 
For  comparison, we first consider what these demand and cost  assumptions 
imply about equilibrium in the traditional static Cournot model. In that model, a 
pair  of  quantities  (q1,  q2)  is  an  equilibrium  if,  for  each  firm  i,  q1 =  qi  maximizes 
6Although  our  model  shares with  that of  Eaton  and  Lipsey  the  property that  capital is  not 
infinitely durable, our conclusions about the nature of equilibrium under the threat of entry differ 
markedly from theirs. See the discussion following Proposition 2. 
7 To ensure the applicability of dynamic programming we shall restrict ql  to a large but bounded 
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IT  given  qi-  (j*  i).  One  can  easily  verify  that,  given  our  demand  and  cost 
assumptions,  there are three equilibria: (qm, 0), (0, qm)  (where qm denotes  the 
monopoly  level  d/2),  and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each firm sets 
q = Jf  with probability a  and with probability 1 -  a  produces nothing, where 
a = (d/f)-2. 
None  of  these three equilibria really models the idea that the threat of entry 
should  drive  an  incumbent's profit to  zero.  The  two  monopolistic  equilibria 
obviously  do  not:  the presence of  a second firm has no  effect at all. One can 
maintain  that such equilibria are unconvincing because, were the other firm to 
enter,  the  incumbent  would  not  keep  q  at  the  monopolistic  level.  But  such 
dynamic considerations are attacks not so much against the equilibria but rather 
against the static nature of the game itself. There is simply no opportunity in a 
one-shot, simultaneous move game to react. 
The  mixed  strategy equilibrium perhaps comes closer to  capturing the zero- 
profit story. At least the two identical firms are treated symmetrically and earn 
zero  profits  on  average. Of  course,  the  equilibrium also  has  the  unfortunate 
property that, with positive probability, neither firm or both firms operate. 
In view of the shortcomings of the static quantity model, we turn to an analysis 
of  the  equilibrium of  our dynamic model. Throughout we make the cost  and 
demand  assumptions (1) and (2). Our main goal is to exhibit, for each possible 
value of the discount factor 8, the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, 
i.e., the unique MPE such that R1 = R2. Our emphasis on symmetric equilibrium 
is meant  to underscore the idea that the firms are inherently identical, so that, 
placed  in  the  same circumstances, they should behave the same way (i.e.,  the 
firms will react identically to a given quantity level q of the other firm). Given the 
large fixed costs, of course, only one firm will end up operating, but, in symmetric 
equilibrium, that firm will be determined by historical accident (e.g., it was lucky 
enough to get there first) rather than by basic strategic differences between firms. 
Here  is  an  outline  of  the  steps  leading  to  the  characterization theorem, 
Proposition 2. We first show (Lemma 1) that equilibrium reaction functions are 
downward sloping, as in the static Cournot model. We then demonstrate (Lemma 
4) that, in a symmetric equilibrium, there exists a deterrence level q-,  i.e., a level of 
operation above which one's rival is deterred from entering and below which the 
rival will enter with positive probability. To do so, we establish (Lemma 3) that if 
a firm reacts to q by operating at a positive level, then that level must exceed q. If 
instead the firm chose a level r < q, it would induce its rival to produce a level r 
greater than r, which in turn would lead the firm to operate below r. Continuing 
iteratively,  we  find that in  every period the  firm produces less  than its  rival, 
implying that its profit must be negative, an impossibility. 
These results straightforwardly  imply that if a firm operates at all, it does so at 
or above the deterrence level (Lemma 5). Thus in equilibrium a firm either drops 
out of the market forever or induces the other firm to do so. 
LEMMA 1:  Equilibrium  dynamic reaction  functions Ri are nonincreasing. That is, 
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REMARK:  Lemma 1, which does not assume symmetry, is a result that obtains 
much  more  generally than in  this specific model.  The  only  property of  'ri  it 
requires is  that the cross partial derivative '1i2  be nonpositive  and, for q  > 0, 
strictly negative. See Section 8 of our companion article for a discussion of the 
role the cross partial assumption plays in our results. 
PROOF:  Suppose that, contrary to our assertion, q > q4  but r > rP,  where, r and 
r are realizations of, say, R2(q)  and R2(q)  (recall that the R"s may be random 
functions).  By definition of R2, r is a best response to q. Thus 
(3)  IT2(q, r) + 3W2(r)  ? 'i2(q,?)  +  rW2(?) 
Similarly, 
(4)  T2 (A  P2  ) +  3W2(r)  >  XT2(  r) + 8W2(r). 
Adding (4) to (3), we obtain 
V  2(q, r) -  q, r) -  '2(q,  r)  + 7(  q)  0, 
which can be rewritten as 
(5)  T2(X,Y)  dydx  >  0. 
q  r 
But because  r 2 (x, y)  is nonpositive and, for y > 0, strictly negative, inequality 
(5) is impossible.  Q.E.D. 
By "dropping out of the market" we mean choosing q= 0.  We next show that 
if  firm 1  drops  out  of  the market with  positive  probability in  response  to  a 
(positive)  move  by firm 2 that was, in  turn, an optimal reaction to  a previous 
move by firm 1, then firm 1 in fact drops out of the market with probability 1. 
LEMMA  2:  In any Markov  perfect equilibrium,  if  0 is a realization of Rl(q)  and 
q > 0 is a realization of R2(q)  for some q, then Rl(q)  = 0. 
PROOF: Because reaction functions are nonincreasing and 0 is a realization of 
Rl(q),  firm 1 must react to any quantity above q by setting 0 with probability 1. 
Thus,  Rl(q + A) = 0  for anyA  > 0. Now  if  Rl(q)>  0 with positive probability, 
W2(q + A) >  W2(q)  for sufficiently small  A because  q + A  induces  firm 1  to 
drop out with probability 1, whereas q does not. Thus for sufficiently small A, 
playing  q earns firm 2 a strictly lower payoff than q + A, a contradiction of the 
optimality of q.  Q.E.D. 
Henceforth  we  shall  confine  our  attention  to  symmetric equilibrium (ones 
where R1 = R2). We first establish Lemma 3. 
LEMMA  3:  In a symmetric  MPE,  if r is a positive realization of R(q)  (we can 
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PROOF:  Suppose first that 0 < r < q. From Lemma 1, R(r)  > r. Moreover, for 
any  realization  of  r^  of  R(r),  there exists  a  realization  r^  of  R(r^) such  that 
P <R(r).  Continuing  iteratively we  find that the firm who  responds to  q  can 
continue to act optimally in such a way that it always produces no more than the 
other firm. Thus, in any period where it produces positively, it must lose money 
-in  particular, when  it  produces  r.  Since it  can  ensure itself  zero profit by 
dropping  out,  operating at a positive  level cannot be  optimal.  Hence  r < q  is 
impossible. 
Next  suppose  that  r = q. If 0 is a realization of  R(r),  then from Lemma 2, 
R(r)  = 0, an impossibility since R(r)  = R(q).  Thus all realizations of R(r)  must 
be positive.  From the preceding paragraph, r < R(r).  Thus, repeating the argu- 
ment of that paragraph, we can once again show that the firm that responds to q 
can always act optimally in ways such that it produces no more than the other 
firm, which gives us the same contradiction as before.  Q.E.D. 
We next show that in a symmetric equilibrium, there exists a deterrence level. 
LEMMA  4:  In  a  symmetric MPE  there exists  q-> 0  such that,  for  all  q>  q, 
R(q)  = 0,  and, for all q < q-, there exists a positive realization of R(q). 
PROOF:  Consider a sequence {  qn} tending monotonically to infinity. Suppose 
that for all n there exists a positive realization rn  of R(qn). From the definition of 
7IT, {  rn  } must be bounded, otherwise instantaneous payoffs become unboundedly 
negative.8  Hence  for sufficiently large n,  qn> rn, a contradiction of  Lemma 3. 
There consequently exists q4  > 0 such that for all q > q4,  R(q)  = 0. Let  q- be the 
infimum of all such qc.  Then for all q > q, R(q)  = 0 and, for all q < q, there exists 
a positive  realization of R(q).  It remains to show that q > 0. Assume therefore 
that  q = 0. Choose  e > 0 so small that  7Tl(qm,  ?) >  0, where qm is the monopoly 
quantity. Because  q= 0,  then R(e) = 0,  and so firm 1 earns zero profit the first 
period  after  firm 2  has  played  ?.  Moreover, firm 1  can  earn no  more  than 
monopoly profit (the theoretical maximum) in any subsequent period. However if 
firm 1 responds to - by playing qm, it earns positive profit the first period, and, if 
it  continues  to  play  qm,  monopoly  profit thereafter. Hence  R(e)  0,  and  so 
> 0.  Q.E.D. 
A firm "takes over the market" if it operates at a level that induces the other 
firm to drop out. We next demonstrate that, in response to  q > 0, a firm either 
takes over or drops out of the market. 
LEMMA  5:  In a symmetric  MPE,  for all q and allpositive realizations r of R(q), 
R(r)  = 0. 
8 This argument may seem to rely on prices becoming negative. However, as long as the marginal 
cost  c is positive, profit is unbounded from below even if the price is bounded below by zero. Firm 
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PROOF: Suppose that, contrary  to the Lemma,  there exists a positive realiza- 
tion r'  of R(r).  From Lemma  3, r > q and r^  > r, a contradiction  of Lemma  1. 
Q.E.D. 
We are nearly  ready  to establish  our main proposition,  which asserts  that, for 
any 8 > 0, there exists a unique symmetric  MPE and exhibits that equilibrium 
explicitly.  To state the proposition,  we consider  the equations 
3 
(6)  r(q, q) +  _  (q,?)  = O, 
(7)  T(q)  =  argmax  (  r(4, q) +  8rr(q, 0) }, 
32 
(8)  gT( q, q ) + SJ( q,O?)  +  -  7Tm_  , 
32 
(9)  r(T(q),  q) + Sr (T(q),  0)  +  1  ;  m  - f  )  0 
where 7T(x,  y) = 7T1(x,  y) and r m is d2/4. 
PROPOSITION  2:  There exist numbers 81,  2 E (0,1)  such that, if  8  is the firms' 
discount factor,  the unique symmetric MPE  of the game with instantaneous  profit 
given by (1)  and (2) is 
0, q > q* 
(10)  R(q)=  if  i<  8 <1, 
q*, q < q* 
0,,q>q** 
(11)  R(q)  =  q**,q  q<q**  if  82  8<;1, 
T(q),  q < q 
and 
0,  q> q*** 
(12)  R(q)  =  if  0<8<32, 
tT(q),  q<  q*** 
where q* q** and q*** are the largest of the roots of (6), (8), and (9) respectively, 
and q solves T(q)=  q**. 
PROOF:  Let q be the deterrence level of Lemma 4. 
CASE  I: q-  > q  m.  If q < 4 then there exists a positive realization  r of R  (q). 
From Lemma  5, R(r) = 0. Hence from the definition  of 4, r > q-.  We have 
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If  r > 4, suppose  that a firm responds to  q with (r + 4)/2  rather than r. Since 
q >  qm,  7r((r +  4)/2,  q) >  7r(r, q).  Furthermore,  since  (r + q)72  > 4,  R((r + 
q)72)  = 0,  and  so  W((r + q-)/2) >  W(r).  Therefore (r + q)/2  generates higher 
profit  than  r,  a  contradiction. We  conclude  that  for  q < q,  the  only  positive 
realization of  R(q)  is  4. Hence, from Lemma 1,  R(q)  = q for all q < q. From 
Lemma 5,  R(i)  = 0.  Therefore, V(#) = 0. Now  for q < q, 
1-3 
Because 7T(q,  q) is decreasing in q, we have V(q) > 0 for all q < q. Furthermore, 
for all q > q we must have 
3 
7T(qg  q) +  i  7rT(q,0)  < 0, 
1 -3 
otherwise R(q)  # 0. Hence  q must equal q*, the greatest root of (6). From (6) 
d+  Vd  2-  4(2-38)f 
(13)  q*  2(-3 
Thus because 4  > qm =  d/2,  (13) implies 
(14)  V 2d2-(2d2+4f)8+8fS0. 
Notice  that because d2 > 4f,  (14) holds for 8 = 1. Since it clearly does not hold 
for 8 = 0, there exists 81 E (0,1)  such that it holds if and only if 8 E [81, 1). Thus 
q > qm implies that 8 E [81, 1) and that (10) holds. Furthermore it is clear that for 
8a <  8 < 1, (10) defines an MPE. 
CASE  II:  q4  < qm.  By the same argument as in case I, R(q)  > q for all q < q. 
In  particular, since monopoly  profit is  the highest conceivable profit level per 
period,  R(O) = qm 
Now  suppose that for q < q, r is a realization of R(q)  but r # max { T(q), q}, 
where T(q)  is given by (7). Then r #  T(q), because r > q. But since 
32 
V(q)  = 7T(r,  q) + 87T(r,0)  +o  (7Tm  -f  ) 
it is clear that discounted profit could be raised by choosing rP(>  4) equal to q or 
T(q).  We conclude that 
R(q)  =max{  ,T(q)} 
for q < q. 
SUBCASE  A:  j> T(q).  Then, for q less than q, 
32 
(15)  r(4,  q) + 87r(40)  +  1  ;(m  -f  ) > ?. 
The inequality reverses for q > 4. Hence 4 = q**, where q** is the larger root of DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY, I  561 
(8). From (8), 
(1 + 8)d+  (1 + 8)2d 2  f4(2:88)  (i-  82d2) 
(16)  q** =  2(2+8) 
Because  4 < qm,  we know from case I that 8 < 81. But from (16) we know that 
there exists 82 E (0, 81) such that 
d  q** 
q>T(q**)  =2  2(1+8) 
holds if and only if 8 E [82, 81).  Thus 4 < qm and 4 > T(4) imply  that 8 E [82, 81), 
that 4  q**, and that R(q) = max  {q**, T(q)} for q <  q**. Now for 8 E (82, 81), 
q** > T(q**), and there  exists q < q** such that q > T(q) if and only if q > q. 
Hence R(q) takes  the form  (11). Furthermore,  if 8 E [82, 81) and R(q) is defined 
by (11) it is straightforward  to verify  that (R, R) constitutes  an MPE. 
SUBCASE  B: 4 < T(4).  Then, for q < 4, 
82 
1(T(q),  q) + 8(T(q),0)  +  1  (Im  f)  > 0, 
with the inequality  reversed  for q > 4. Hence 4= q***, the larger  root of (9). By 
elimination, we conclude that if  4<  T(4), then R(q)  is defined by (12) and 
8 <  82. Conversely,  one can easily  check  that for 8 < 82, (R, R) with R defined  by 
(12), constitutes  a symmetric  MPE.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  2 shows  that, regardless  of the discount  factor,  equilibrium  takes  a 
simple form. Namely, there  is a deterrence  level 4, such that if a firm's  rival is 
currently  operating  at or above this level, the firm  will produce  nothing.  How- 
ever,  if the rival falls short  of 4, the firm  will operate  at least at the level 4. Thus, 
there is a unique steady-state  outcome wherein  the single firm in the market 
operates at the level max  {  4, qm  }.  Moreover,  starting  from any other position, 
that steady-state  is reached  in a maximum  of three  periods. 
The deterrence  level 4 monotonically  increases  in the discount  factor 8 (and 
decreases  in the fixed  cost f).  When  8 is comparatively  high (greater  than 81), 4 
is above the monopoly  quantity  qm  (see Figure  1). That  is, to drive  out its rival  or 
deter it from entering,  a firm  must operate  above the monopoly  level. If the firm 
actually  uses all the capacity  it has installed,9  it, therefore,  charges  less than the 
monopoly  price.  Given  these  restrictions,  the firm  will produce  exactly  4. This  is a 
result  reminiscent  of the limit  pricing  literature  (see Gaskins  (1971), Kamien  and 
Schwartz  (1971), and Pyatt  (1971)):  an incumbent  firm  sells at a price  sufficiently 
low that the immediate  short-run  losses of entry outweigh  the longer  run gains. 
9 This  will be the case,  for  instance,  if the marginal  cost c reflects  primarily  installation  rather  than 
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FIGURE  1.  81 <  8 <  1. 
(Dotted  lines denote firm l's reaction function; solid lines denote firm 2's reaction function.) 
Since 4 must satisfy  (6) notice that, as 8 tends to 1, vl(q, 0) tends to zero. That 
is, instantaneous  profit  is driven  down to the competitive  level. Hence our model 
confirms the heuristic stories of  Grossman  (1981) and Baumol, Panzar, and 
Willig (1982) if firms  place sufficient  weight  on future  profits. 
Our conclusion  differs  from that of Eaton and Lipsey (1980), although  those 
authors'  model shares  with ours the property  that instantaneous  profit tends to 
zero as the length of commitment  shrinks.  Eaton and Lipsey  allow for only one 
level of capital and do not obtain our "contestability"  conclusion  that instanta- 
neous output/capacity tends toward  the socially optimal level as the threat  of 
entry increases.  Indeed, in their model, profit is driven to zero because of the 
accumulation of  socially useless capital. (Of course, our result relies on the 
"exact-Cournot  form."  That  is, the firms  are supposed  to choose  prices  that clear 
the market  given their  capacity.  As we note in footnote 9, this property  holds if 
the marginal  cost of investment  in capacities  is sufficiently  large. For smaller 
investment costs, results  intermediate  between those of Eaton-Lipsey  and ours 
would hold.) 
When the discount factor is less than 81, the deterrence  level is below the 
monopoly level (see Figures  2 and 3). Hence, the steady-state  quantity  is the 
monopoly  level itself, a result  in keeping  with the barriers  to entry  tradition.  How 
a firm  takes  over the market  from  its rival  depends  on the discount  factor  and the 
rival's quantity, q. The firm could always drive the rival out by choosing q. 
However, for moderate discount factors (82  < 8 < 81)  and low values of  q or for 
low discount  factors  (8 < 81) and any q (less than q), the firm  prefers  to operate 
above q, namely at T(q).  T(q), defined  by (7), can be thought  of as the optimal DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY, I  563 
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" two-period reaction" function. It is a firm's best response to q in a game with a 
two-period  horizon, given that the other firm does  not  produce in  the second 
period. 
We ought to mention that although Proposition 2 exhibits the unique symmet- 
ric  MPE,  there are also, for sufficiently large fixed costs  and discount factors, 
exactly  two  other,  highly asymmetric MPE's.  Specifically, for  such  costs  and 
discount factors, if firm 1 always uses its two-period reaction function, then firm 
2  will  always  stay  out  of  the market. Conversely, if  firm 2  never enters, the 
two-period reaction function is optimal for firm 1. Thus this pair of strategies is 
an MPE, and so is the pair with the roles of the players interchanged. 
PROPOSITION  3:  There exist  8 E (0, 1) and f < vm  such that if  8  5 <  1 and 
f < f <  7Tm,  there are exactly two asymmetric  equilibria: 
(R',  R2) =  (T,O) 
and 
(R,  R  2) =(0,  T), 
where T satisfies (7). 
PROOF:  See the Appendix. 
Notice  that in these asymmetric equilibria, the firm remaining in the market 
ultimately operates at the monopoly level even if  8  is near 1. Thus, if one does 
not accept our above justification for emphasizing the symmetric equilibrium, one 
may place less weight on our contestability conclusions. 
Our uniqueness result depends, of course, on the Markov assumption. For the 
usual  "Folk  Theorem" reasons, there are many symmetric perfect equilibria in 
this model that are not Markovian. For example, there is one in which the firms 
take  turns  operating  at  the  monopoly  level.  Despite  our  defense  of  Markov 
strategies, therefore, one might wonder why the firms do not  "agree" to adopt 
this more profitable equilibrium in preference to the Markov equilibrium. 
One  answer  might  be  that  tacit  collusion  between  duopolists  arises in  in- 
dustries where each firm expects the other to remain in the market for a long 
time. But if only one firm ends up operating in the long run, the opportunity for 
collusive behavior may be smaller (admittedly, this is an informal argument that 
awaits  rigorous  treatment).'0 Another  possible  explanation  is  that  alternating 
monopoly  is disadvantageous because of the cost of entering and reentering the 
market. This line is pursued in the following section. Finally, one might interpret 
our infinite-horizon model as the limit of a sequence of finite-horizon models as 
the  horizon  grows (we  stress this interpretation in  Maskin-Tirole (1987)). We 
10  This response does not apply to the price-setting model of our companion paper, where both 
duopolists  are  present  throughout. As  we  shall  see,  however,  Markov equilibria  themselves  are 
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conjecture  that the unique  limit of the finite-horizon  equilibria  is our symmetric 
MPE (this is certainly  the case  in the small  fixed  cost model  of our (1987)  paper). 
4. ENDOGENOUS  TIMING 
We admitted  in the introduction  that the imposition  of alternating  moves is 
artificial. There seems no  reason why, in  principle, firms could not  move 
simultaneously.11  In this section  we extend  the alternating  moves  model to allow 
the relative  timing  of firms  to be endogeneously  determined.  There  is a variety  of 
alternative  ways such an extension  might be made, depending  on the particular 
technological  or contractual  reasons  why firms  are committed  in the short-run. 
Here we discuss two possible endogenous  timing models. Although they are 
highly stylized,  they suggest  that our results  may be robust  to more satisfactory 
constructs. 
In our first pass at endogenous  timing,  we abandon  the assumption  that firms 
alternate.  We will continue,  however,  to suppose  that time is measured  discretely, 
and so the intertemporal  profit  functions  are the same  as before.  Firm 1 (firm  2) 
is no longer  constrained  to move  only in odd- (even-)numbered  periods.  Nonethe- 
less, when a firm does act, it remains  committed  to that action  for two periods.'2 
If in any period a firm  does not have a commitment  pending  it is free to move. 
Failure  to do so amounts  to being out of the market  for a period  (and therefore 
corresponds  to zero profit).  Thus at any time where  it is uncommitted,  the firm 
can either  move or select the "null action." 
From the point of view of a firm  about to act, the payoff-relevant  information 
is whether  (i) the other  firm  is currently  committed,  and (ii) if so, at what level. 
We continue to  require that strategies  be  Markov, i.e., dependent only on 
payoff-relevant  information.  Thus a Markov  strategy  for firm i can be described 
by the pair {  Ri(.),  Si}, where  Ri'(-), as before,  describes  how firm  i reacts  to the 
other firm's  current  action and Si prescribes  its move when the other  firm  is not 
currently committed. Both Si  and  R'(ai),  for any action ai,  are random 
variables  that take their values in the union of the action space with the null 
action. 
Notice that if, along the equilibrium  path, a firm  chooses prices according  to 
R'(-), the firms  alternate  in their  moves  (alternating  mode).  By contrast,  when Si 
dictates  i's equilibrium  behavior,  firms  act at the same  time  (simultaneous  mode). 
Markov strategies and equilibria are now more complicated than in  the 
fixed-timing  model. Nevertheless,  in the two cases we consider  in this pair of 
papers-the  quantity model of  this  paper and  the  price model  of  Part 
11-steady-state equilibrium  behavior  remains  essentially the same as before. 
This fact is  established for the price model in  our companion paper. The 
11  Of course,  literal  simultaneity  is unlikely.  However,  that firms  act in ignorance  of other  firms' 
moves is all that is needed  for de  facto simultaneity. 
12 More  generally,  we might  imagine  that the firm  is committed  for m periods.  What  is important 
is that m be greater  than 1, i.e., the period  of commitment  should  exceed  the basic decision  period. 
This is certainly  true  of firms  constrained  by contracts  for labor,  machinery  leasing,  or franchising.  It 
is also likely to hold for firms  that compete  in prices  by mailing  price  lists or who are pressured  by 
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following  observations  for the quantity  model  with large  fixed  costs are  proved  in 
Maskin-Tirole  (1982). 
First, for 8  near 1, there exists a simultaneous  mode strategy  S  such that 
{R(.),  S}  defines a  symmetric  equilibrium,  where R(.)  is  given by (10) in 
Proposition  2, and S is a random  quantity  choice (S has no arguments  because, 
in the simultaneous  mode, there  is no payoff relevant  variable).  Starting  at any 
initial configuration  of actions,  the firms  switch  to the altemating  mode in finite 
time with probability  one, and stay in that mode forever.  The steady  state output 
is q as defined in (6). Second,  if we introduce  an entry/reentry  cost exceeding 
1T'(1  +  8)  and the fixed cost is "sufficiently large,"13  (a slightly modified version 
of)  R describes the long-run  behavior  of the system in the unique  symmetric 
MPE of the endogeneous  timing  game. 
Let us now tum to a second way of endogenizing  the timing.  This model is 
highly special, but its  simplicity allows us  to  derive the exogenous timing 
two-period  commitment  framework  directly  (not only as an equilibrium  outcome 
as in the previous  model).  Specifically,  let us now suppose  that time  is continuous 
and discounted  at rate r. Instantaneous profit  7T1(al,  a2)  now represents a flow 
per unit of time.  When  a firm  chooses  an action,  its period  of commitment  to that 
action is  stochastic. We shall assume, in fact, that commitment  lengths are 
governed  by a Poisson  process.14 Thus, in the time interval  At, the probability 
that the commitment  will lapse is X  At, where  X is the Poisson  parameter. 
Random commitment may arise when capital has  an uncertain working 
lifetime (here, as in the fixed-timing  model, we assume that the fixed cost of 
capital is incurred  up-front).  Of course, the Poisson property-the  assumption 
that the probability  the machine  will give out in the next instant  is independent 
of its current  age-is  extreme.  Its primary  virtue  is its simplicity.15 
In this model, the physical  state of the system  from  the point of view of a firm 
about to choose an action  is exactly  as in the discrete  framework.  Thanks  to our 
Poisson assumption,  the length  of time the other  firm  has been committed  to this 
action is not relevant;  only the action itself is. Hence, a Markov strategy  is 
exactly the same as before.  Indeed,  formally,  our continuous  time model reduces 
to the two-period  commitment,  discrete-time  framework  of Section  2. To see this 
more clearly,  note that the dynamic  programming  equations  describing  Markov 
perfect equilibrium  have the same form in both cases. For instance,  if firm  2 is 
currently committed to  action a2  and firm 1  is  about to  act, the present 
discounted  value of l's profit  in the continuous-time  model is 
V1(a2)  =  max {figl(al, a2) At + AAtWl(aal)e  rt 
al 
+(1  -  AAt)Vl(a2)er-rAt 
13 It is sufficient  that  2ir'/3  <f.  The  entry  cost rules  out equilibria  in which  firms  take  turns  being 
monopolists. 
14 We could introduce  the possibility  of a null action  without  appreciable  change.  15  If we abandoned  the Poisson  assumption,  a firm's  reaction  would  also depend  on the age of the 
other firm's  machine.  We believe,  however,  that the qualitative  results  of Section 3 would not be 
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where W1(a1) is firm l's  present discounted profit assuming that it is currently 
committed to a'  and firm 2 is about to act. But this equation can be rewritten as 
Vl2=  1(a2)lnax((')  V(a )  maxt  +r  +  j  Wl(al)}, 
which is the exact analogue of the equation we obtained in Section 2B. 
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APPENDIX 
PROPOSITION  3:  There exist 8 e  (0, 1)  and f<  '  fm  such that if  8 <  8 < 1 and f  f<  Im,  there are 
exactly two asymmetric equilibria: 
(R',  R2)  =  (T,O) 
and 
(R1,R2)  =  (O,T), 
where T satisfies (7). 
PROOF: We begin  by observing that, for 8  sufficiently high and f  (5/7)IT',  firm 1 must lose 
money  over  the  two  periods if  it  plays  positively  the  first period  and  firm 2  responds with  its 
" two-period reaction function." That is, 
(Al)  sup {(&7 (q,O))  + 8(rl  (q,  T(q)))}  < 0. 
q>O 
Substituting for &rl  in the left-hand side of (Al)  and using 
d  q 
T( q)  =-  - 
2  2(1?+8)' 
we obtain 
max (q(d  -q)  -f+  8  q(--  q)  f  q 
2  2(1?+8) 
which for 8 =  1 is negative if 
9  9 
(A2)  f  >-_d2  =_  7M. 
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Hence, by continuity, (Al)  holds for 8 in a neighborhood of 1 if f>  (5/7)sm. 
We  next assert that, for sufficiently high 8  and f,  the counterpart of  Lemma 5 for asymmetric 
equilibria holds (the proof can be found in our (1982) working paper). 
CLAIM:  For sufficiently high 8 < 1 and f<  irm,  R2(r) = 0  for all positive realizations r of  Rl(q) 
and all q, if  R1 and  R2 are equilibrium dynamic reaction functions. 568  ERIC  MASKIN  AND JEAN  TIROLE 
Consider an asymmetric  Markov  perfect equilibrium.  For each i,  let  4'-inf  { q  IRJ(q)  =0) 
(conceivably  4' could equal  0 or oo), j * i. Suppose  first  that  0 < q4,  42<  0.  Let 
41  =  limsup {  rlrE  R'(42  - 
e  ?0 
By definition  of  -2,  r'(E)=sup{rIrER'(42-E)}>0  for any  e>0.  Hence from the above claim 
and Lemma  1, R  (r'(e))  = 0, and so r1(E)  > 4'. We conclude  that 4' > 4'. If 4' > qm, then  4'  =  41, 
otherwise  for small E,  firm  1 could  reduce  its output,  raise  its short-period  profit  and still deter  entry 
in response  42-  E. If  41 < q',  then 4' < qm, and so 41 = max (if,  T(42)}. 
There  are therefore  three  possibilities: 
(i  41 = 41 >  n 
(ii)  qm > 41.=.  q'>  T( q2) 
or 
(iii)  q  >  .  =  T(42)  >  41. 
We first  rule  out cases  (ii) and  (iii). If, to the  contrary,  either  case  holds,  then  if firm  1 plays qfl + e, 
firm  2 will not produce.  Hence  firm  1 can earn  essentially  monopoly  profit  indefinitely.  Thus  for high 
discount  factors  42 >  qn1. If q2  =  00,  then 
[  ~~~~~~~~2 
lim -(-q  )q+  (_l)l+_  7m_f  ]>  O 
4L?  1-8  1 
which is plainly false.  Hence q2 <  oo. Then 
82 
(A3)  (d  42-ql  )ql + 8(d  )ql  tm  f)  = o. 
Similarly, 
(A4)  (d  -  4'-2)42?+  8  (d-42)42_-  0. 
Now as 8 tends to 1, 42  must  grow  indefinitely  if (A3) is to hold. But (A4) clearly  cannot  hold for 
arbitrarily  large 42,  and so, for large  8, cases  (ii) and (iii) are impossible. 
We conclude  that either 
(iv)  4'>qm,  i=1,2, 
or 
(v)  4=-0  or  420=0 
If (iv) holds then 
(A5)  (d-  41  42)41  +  8  (d-  41)41 
f 




which implies  ql =  q2,  violatin2_  asymmetry. 
Thus (v) must hold. If  4  =0,  then R2(q) =  T(q).  From (Al),  we deduce that R'(q) =0. 
Similarly  4 = 0 implies  that  (Rl,  R2) = (T, 0).  Q.E.D. 
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